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ABSTRACT
Lebanon’s turbulent history has seen many political assassinations,
but only one, the assassination of PM Rafic Hariri, led to the
establishment of an international tribunal – The Special Tribunal
for Lebanon (STL) – in 2009. Why was the STL created? This study
suggests that the creation of the STL constituted a ‘normative
intervention’: purposeful attempts by domestic and international
actors to transmit norms and institutions to a country to realize
political goals. Normative interventions, particularly in divided
societies, trigger ‘normative contestations’, which are shaped by
the identities and interests of various actors. The result reveals
that normative interventions deepen existing political cleavages.
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On 14 February 2005, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri and 21 bystan-
ders were killed when a massive, highly sophisticated explosion destroyed his motorcade
driving through downtown Beirut. Lebanon’s troubled political history has seen presi-
dents, prime ministers, ministers, parliamentarians, party leaders, journalists, and
writers killed, particularly during its fifteen-year long civil war (Mugraby 2008, 176).
While political assassination is not unique, this was the first to trigger the establishment
of an international criminal tribunal (ICT) in 2009: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
Given a recent past replete with far more devastating and still unaddressed crimes in the
face of ‘state-sponsored amnesia’ (Knudsen and Hanafi 2013, 176–200), why was this tri-
bunal created? Why was debate over the STL so central to and explosive for Lebanese pol-
itical rivalries between 2004 and 2011?
The development and expansion of international criminal justice norms and insti-
tutions since the 1990s partly explains the willingness of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (UNC) to
create a commission of inquiry (UNIIIC) and then a tribunal that would provide capacity
for a deadlocked Lebanese polity. Regionally, of course, the post-colonial Arab world had
been no stranger to interventions, but these have typically been military or economic in
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nature. This instance, however, which places the STL’s jurisdiction above that of the
Lebanese state, remains the most pronounced regional example of what we treat
here as an ‘international normative intervention’. This normative intervention originated
in the context of the United States (US)-led strategy in 2003–5 to weaken and isolate the
Syrian regime, which had controlled Lebanon since 1990. But this strategy generated
resistance from America’s rivals in Lebanon, namely Hizbullah, and provoked normative
contestation over the legitimacy of the STL. The aim of this study is to examine the
nature of this normative intervention and to understand the contestation it generated
in Lebanon.
The core theoretical component of our discussion emerges from and responds to
extant IR approaches to the study of ‘norm diffusion’. We examine how and why a
certain set of international norms and institutional practices travel to, shape, and are
reshaped by the politics of Lebanon as a divided society. The process we examine empha-
sizes the role of both international and domestic actors as transmitters and supporters or
challengers of such international norms. These transmitted norms purportedly embodied
in the STL included individual criminal responsibility under international law, international
best practices of investigation and trial procedure, as well as terrorism as a crime under
international customary law that certain Lebanese actors promoted to punish their
rivals. Yet the process of normative intervention goes beyond transmission: we show
how domestic actors negotiate, reframe, and, sometimes, reject international norms
because of extant political interests. Yet, the STL’s detractors, especially Hizbullah,
could not simply reject its mandate. Rather, this normative intervention triggered dom-
estic political and normative contestations that centred on the extent to which the STL
threatened or bolstered Lebanese sovereignty.
The example of Lebanon as a divided society provides interesting theoretical and
empirical avenues that question the dominant approaches of ‘norm diffusion’ to and
socialization of unitary states in international relations. While we show how the evolution
of normative intervention remains open and contested at both the international and
domestic levels, our focus here is on the domestic context. In the case of divided societies,
political debates occurring in the tumult of a crisis, such as Hariri’s killing, will bring the very
nature of the state’s identity and interests into question. This was inevitable in the case of
the STL, which sought to affirm domestic legal capacity through the paradoxical removal of
prosecutorial powers from Lebanese soil. Was this an assault on Lebanese sovereignty or
its affirmation? Divided and divisive readings of Lebanon’s historical experience of
foreign intervention inform our answer to this question. In seeking to understand the poss-
ible effects of normative intervention, our theoretical framework demonstrates the need to
explore the constrained discursive agency of domestic political actors in their (re)framing of
international and internationalized domestic norms (Barnett 1999, 8).
The study comprises three sections. First, we set up our framework of normative inter-
vention. Second, we discuss the domestic and regional political context to identify the
major actors who sought to promote certain international norms and institutions associ-
ated with the STL. In the final section, we draw on primary data (press conferences,
speeches, interviews, and UN and STL documents) to show how various actors strategi-
cally framed and interpreted the STL by invoking legal, normative, and political discourses
as they advanced their case in support (Hariri’s Future Movement) or rejection (Hizbullah)
of the STL. The empirical case centres on how Lebanese contests over the Tribunal’s
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legitimacy were an opportunity to recreate understandings about the meaning of Leba-
nese sovereignty. We conclude by arguing that rather than assist in the realization of pol-
itical stability and domestic legal capacity, normative interventions and their attendant
normative contestations tend to deepen political cleavages – especially for divided
societies, such as Lebanon’s.
The politics of normative intervention
We suggest that the establishment of the STL constitutes an ‘international normative
intervention’. In understanding normative interventions, we build on approaches to
norm diffusion in International Relations. We take norms to mean the ‘shared (social)
understandings of standards for behaviour’ (Abboud and Muller 2013). Norms constitute
and constrain behaviour: they provide an interpretative frame for a given situation requir-
ing certain behaviour as a result. They carry with them a sense of legitimate social obli-
gation (Abboud and Muller 2013; Wiener 2014, 3) and inspire rules that are the content
of law: rights and obligations as guaranteed within a specific legal system, whether inter-
national (such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)) or domestic
(such as Lebanon’s criminal justice system). However, norms will only be recognized as
standards to follow once relevant political agents are persuaded of their suitability or
appropriateness, along moral or practical lines (March and Olsen 2008).
The transmission of international norms to domestic contexts has generated a range of
approaches within international relations scholarship. Early scholarship focussed on norm
‘life cycles’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) or ‘norm diffusion’which tends to consider how
an international standard emerges and is then carried by norm entrepreneurs to the dom-
estic level, often through a sophisticated persuasive strategy of aligning national interests
with the purported norm (Hirsch 2014, 814). For example, in their influential book, Activists
Beyond Borders, Finnemore and Sikkink are concerned with tracing the mobilizing effect of
advocacy about bodily harm and legal equality of opportunity (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998). They argue that these norms can rally supporters to form transnational advocacy
networks. Norm entrepreneurs within such networks work to persuade governments
about the need for domestic policy change. Although conceding some scope for cultural
diversity, they argue that consensus around ‘human dignity’ transcends particularity and
is a powerful resource for social change (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 205). A similar focus
on ‘human dignity’ animates Teitel’s Humanity Law, a narrative about an ever more
robust practice of claim-making for individual protection, whether within or beyond
the state and typically as championed by courts (Teitel 2011).
While we note these contributions, our study builds on a ‘second wave’ of more critical
norm research which questions some key dimensions of this work (Acharya 2004, 240).
First, collectively, standard ‘norm diffusion’ approaches follow progress narratives
based on liberal ideologies (Bloomfield 2015, 4; Epstein 2012, 136) recounting how
(good, cosmopolitan) norms flow to (local, particular, often non-Western) actors
(Dunford 2015) through conversion rather than contestation (Acharya 2004, 242).
Authors do note the importance of understanding the particular norm and context at
hand, but the ‘unidirectional’ (Zimmermann 2017, 873), teleological (Bloomfield 2015,
4; Bucher 2014, 751–752) and moralizing thrust is palpable, where the scope for non-
Western norms becoming globalized seems limited (Dunford 2015). While some of the
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literature has considered this through the concept of localization (Acharya 2004) or appro-
priation (Zimmermann, Deitelhoff, and Lesch 2017, 695–697), our framework pushes this
further within the context of a divided society.
Second, the agency of ‘transnational’ norm entrepreneurs is crucial in the dominant
approaches within the norm cycle literature. Yet in focusing on how norm entrepreneurs
carry international norms to the domestic level, scholars tend to treat the content of the
norm as settled because of ‘shared understandings’ (Niemann and Schillinger 2016, 29;
Bloomfield 2015, 4). Like other later work, we want to pause and consider simply the
process of contestation itself as a valuable theoretical and empirical concern within a
given domestic, political context as developed further below (Zimmermann 2016, 98-
107). This, moreover, leads us to question the imagery of ‘diffusion’ ‘and ‘cascade’
(especially see Kim and Sikkink 2013) that is used in the literature as it is redolent of inevit-
ability and tends to construct (especially developing) states as passive norm recipients
(Capie 2008, 639). In contrast to a focus on transnational norm entrepreneurs, second
wave scholarship stresses the need to consider agency at the domestic level (Acharya
2004; Checkel 1999; Wiener 2018) in bringing about acceptance, modification, localization
or rejection of a norm.
Third, while many second wave scholars have stressed the importance of exploring the
particularities of a given domestic setting, overwhelmingly the (developing) state is pre-
sented as relatively unitary (for example Acharya 2004; Niemann and Schillinger 2016;
Sandholtz 2008; Sharman 2008, 639). In her recent work, Wiener has challenged such
state-centricity by calling for an exploration of global/local norm dynamics that do not
simply equate to the global/state-level; instead, we can open up the state to ‘cultural
diversity’ (Wiener 2018). Such an emphasis on culture is especially evident in Checkel’s
exploration of the ‘cultural match’ between international norms and their domestic recep-
tion (Checkel 1999). He categorizes domestic orders into four types and notes that norms
are easier to absorb in states less prone to political contestation, namely statist and state-
above-society variants. Yet for corporatist states, of which Lebanon is an example, societal
pressures will play an important role in facilitating the possibility of norm empowerment
(Checkel 1999, 89–90), thus calling for thick accounts of domestic contexts.
While the work of Wiener and Checkel is important, normative intervention in Leba-
non’s deeply divided society (Knudsen and Hanafi 2013) warrants a more sustained
exploration beyond a standard corporatist model. Deeply divided societies are composed
of communities with different cultural, religious, linguistic, racial, or religious identities
that interact within a territorial state. These cleavages are politicized when actors
within the communities mobilize followers to achieve certain political goals, which are
usually related to the nature of political order, identity of the state, or foreign policy
(Lustick 1979; Saouli 2019). This has important implications in understanding normative
diffusion and intervention in a divided society, particularly as each Lebanese actor con-
structed and promoted its own understanding of sovereignty as it sought to either
promote or undermine the STL.
We define normative intervention as the purposeful attempts by political actors (dom-
estic, international, or both working in concert) to (re)frame and impose international
norms or institutions in domestic settings with the aim of creating the discursive, legal,
and institutional conditions that enable the realization of political goals. The idea of ‘inter-
vention’ stresses the importance of power and inequality in studying norms (Epstein
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2012), which is crucial when thinking about developing states such as Lebanon with their
sustained historical experiences of state (re-) building (Saouli 2012) and (neo)colonial
intervention and domination (Inayatullah and Blaney 2012, 169).
Our framework rests on several assumptions. First, we note the presence of political
actors with established identities and interests. These actors seek to invoke, transmit,
internalize or debunk a norm to realize a political goal, usually targeting their domestic
or international rivals; they are the progenitors of the normative intervention. By invoking
certain norms, progenitors of an intervention try to alter the ‘communicative environ-
ment’ (Payne 2001, 39; Sharman 2008). What a normative intervention targets is an
opponent’s ‘subjectivity rather than physicality’ (Bially-Mattern 2005, 602), by pointing
to contradictions and inconsistencies in their professed public commitments (Bially-
Mattern 2005, 603). The politics of normative intervention is, thus, about political actors
acting as norm exemplars – such as championing Lebanese sovereignty or international
accountability – with the aim of achieving political goals.
Second, we suggest that intervention will trigger a reaction from political rivals causing
‘normative contestation’, which Wiener defines as ‘the societal practice… [which] criti-
cally questions societal rules, regulations or procedures by engaging multiple codes in
non-formal environments.’ (Wiener 2014, 2). While we note that Wiener’s scholarship is
foundational for understanding contestation (Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2020), we
concur with a small group of scholars pushing for greater consideration of resistance
(especially Bloomfield 2015; Capie 2008; Epstein 2012) in contexts where no shared nor-
mative understanding or reconciliation can be assumed (Niemann and Schillinger 2016,
47–48). For example, while Acharya (2004) illustrates how domestic Asian societies do
not necessarily share the same worldview as transnational norm entrepreneurs, his
model suggests a shared domestic normative order. We argue that this is not the case
for Lebanon as well as other divided societies, and so requires a deeper consideration
of the domestic process of contestation in the wake of a normative intervention. The cre-
ation of the STL cannot be understood simply as Lebanon accepting specific ‘rule of law’
norms; it was also a normative contest over how to frame and define Lebanese sovereignty
through a range of international and national legal idioms. Political detractors could not
simply reject the STL as this might have undermined their legitimacy as ‘lawful’ actors;
thus, they had to promote their (political) interests through normative contestation.
This involved attempts by both camps to justify their stance using legalized arguments
that centred on not only technical aspects of the STL’s creation, but on what it means
to champion Lebanese sovereignty.
Third, and in addition to the presence of political rivals, the necessity for normative
contestation derives from the presence of a third party: the public, as a politically
latent audience. The resort to normative, public contestations by political actors is
telling, for it contributes to their legitimacy in the eyes of the polity and, ultimately, to
their political survival. Thus, in attempting to convince the public, political actors invest
in speeches and performances to frame events in ways that resonate not only with
their interests, but also with the public’s cultural and political expectations and values
(Krebs and Jackson 2007, 43–44). Framing ‘provides the sorts of shared meaning necess-
ary to facilitate social mobilisation’ (Schwedler 2005, 162). This is especially important
during periods of national crisis, as our case-studies shows. During such crises, ‘political
entrepreneurs must construct frames that are able to reconcile these contradictions, to
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situate these events in ways that mesh with the cultural terrain, or to recast the relation-
ship between the cultural foundations, the costs and benefits of particular policies and
the circumstances at hand’ (Barnett 1999, 15). The collection of performances and
speeches amount to competing ‘representations’ of reality that are communicated to
an audience: ‘the most efficacious communicative strategy will be one that leaves the
audience no room to refuse; it will seek to boldly defeat alternatives without hesitation,
engagement, discussion, or physical antics’ (Bially-Mattern 2005, 610; also see Krebs
and Jackson 2007).
Fourth, normative interventions and contestations do not take place in a socio-political
void; rather, they shape and are in turn reshaped by the existing social order. Normative con-
testations in contexts of deep political crisis shape and condition the behaviour of political
actors, ignite questions about identity and interest, and raise queries about the ‘right’ course
a society shouldpursue. This is particularly salientwhenpolitical stakes are high, as in divided
societies (Lustick 1979). In the case of Lebanon, the international investigation of Harriri’s
assassination and the establishment of the STL aimed to deter future assassinations and
to nurture certain legal standards that Lebanon’s supposedly weak judicial system lacked.
But, more crucially, the establishment of the STL was also a continuation of politics in
other legalized registers: its domestic and international proponents hoped to punish the
alleged killer, Syria, and to defeat Syria’s ally, Hizbullah (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek
2007, 235). Domestic divisions in Lebanon and its geopolitical location in a highly penetrated
regional system have historically made the country extremely vulnerable to external infiltra-
tion (Saouli 2006). Lebanonhas experienceda rangeof political, economic, andmilitary inter-
ventions. Here, we look at another form of infiltration – normative intervention.
The case-study reveals that normative contestations in periods of national crisis and
divided societies often end up ‘diluting’ the desired effects of certain international insti-
tutions and standards. Paradoxically, the creation of the STL rather than strengthening
Lebanese institutions, only deepened existing divisions over the nature of Lebanese
sovereignty. These battles over the legitimacy of such impositions do not lead to a
clear ‘winner’ or ‘loser’, as ultimately, in this case, the STL’s creation was a form of nor-
mative intervention that was successfully deflected through sustained normative con-
testation. Opponents of the STL, especially Hezbollah, used often highly legalized
speech to discredit the Tribunal and to strip it of much of its legitimacy.
Our framework offers several theoretical advantages: it highlights the role of agents as
carriers and interpreters of norms; it locates agents within specific socio-political contexts,
thus showing how structures constrain actors; it emphasizes the role of norms as both
enabling and constraining factors in political rivalries; and it offers a more concrete
basis for the transmission and internalization of norms at the domestic level. While nor-
mative intervention is an international, transnational and domestic phenomenon, our
focus here is on the domestic contestation that occurred in Lebanon over the imposition
of the STL. This focus is important given that the main goal of the Tribunal was to over-
come domestic divisions and bring about accountability and reconciliation. We suggest
that the results thus far remain far from such aspirations. Instead, the STL has contributed
to further destabilization through the degree of contestation – largely discursive, but also
physically violent – that has taken place.
The methodology of discourse analysis that we use here traces normative contestation
empirically through examining discursive domestic battles that ensued after the STL’s
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creation between 2009 and 2011. During this inception phase of the STL, Lebanese pol-
itical actors engaged in unprecedented legalized debates through highly public, televised
speeches, and debates. We read these texts within the broader context of the STL as nor-
mative contestation over how Lebanon should be governed. Exploring the imagery
deployed in such discourse is important, as Bucher notes, to ‘pay attention not only to
what is being said in discourse, but to how it is said, by and to whom it is said, and in
what context’ (Bucher 2014, 747, emphasis in original). We supplement our contextual
reading of this discourse with interviews conducted in Beirut in 2010 with some key sup-
porters and detractors of the Tribunal as well as UN documents, speeches, parliamentary
conferences, and Nassrallah’s dedicated televised conferences.
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Political crisis in a divided society
Since its founding in 1920, Lebanon has been one of the most unstable states in the
Middle East. A combination of domestic and external factors has made this small state vul-
nerable to regional power shifts. Lebanon’s religious pluralism (Lebanon is home to
seventeen Christian and Muslim sectarian communities) and its consociational (or cor-
poratist) political system have kept its various sectarian communities in a state of
rivalry. For most of its modern history, Lebanon’s consociational democracy has guaran-
teed a level of representation and power-sharing for the country’s religious communities.
It also guaranteed their freedoms. But the system also encouraged several weaknesses,
relating to the country’s national identity (Arab versus Lebanese), foreign policy orien-
tation (Arab versus Western), and the basis of its power-sharing formula: until 1990, Chris-
tians held the most parliamentary and ministerial seats even though Muslims were in the
majority.
Lebanon’s geopolitical location, neighbouring Syria from the north and east and Israel
from the south, has made it either a potential buffer state to contain regional rivalries or a
battleground to vent them. The combination of domestic rivalries and geopolitical
location has exposed Lebanon to various political shocks, generating civil wars almost
every fifteen years (particularly those in 1958, 1975–90, and the 2005–15 domestic
conflicts) (Saouli 2006).
1990 marked the end of Lebanon’s last and most bloody civil war. In 1990, Syria agreed
to support the US invasion of Iraq in return for political and military control of Lebanon.
Syria’s occupation of Lebanon generated relative stability and enabled the institutionali-
zation of the Ta’if Accord. The resulting constitution transferred Lebanese political power
in favour of the Muslims, giving them equal political representation and shifted executive
power from the Presidency (held by a Christian) to the Government (led by a Sunni-
Muslim) (Jiha 1998). Key Christian leaders paid a heavy political price: many were either
exiled or imprisoned. Among the main Muslim leaders was the Sunni Rafiq Hariri, who pre-
sided over most governments in the post-war period, 1992–2005. Hariri enjoyed strong
support domestically from his Sunni social base and externally from Saudi Arabia and
the US.
The pillars of Lebanon’s stability in the period 1990–2005 began to shake, however,
when the US invaded Iraq for a second time in 2003. Syria (and Iran) feared that a
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stable US presence in Iraq would spill over into Syria, either by precipitating regime
change in Damascus or by pressuring the Syrian Ba’ath regime to alter its stance vis-à-
vis the Arab-Israeli conflict (Hinnebusch 2006). In 2004, the US and France sponsored
UNSC Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of all ‘foreign forces’ from
Lebanon (meaning, Syria), along with the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese
and non-Lebanese militias’ (UNSC, 2004, 1), which meant Hizbullah.
The resolution had a direct impact on Lebanon’s fragile political balance (Saouli 2006,
712–714). Syria’s Lebanese allies rejected Resolution 1559, characterizing it as a threat to
Lebanese sovereignty; but its enemies regarded it as an opportunity to undermine Syria’s
power and eventually expel it from Lebanon. Whilst the Christian opposition stood
against Syria and the Shi’ite Muslims expressed clear support for it, the main group in
the centre was the Sunni Muslims, led by Rafiq Hariri. Despite Hariri’s strong ties with
Syria for most of the 1990s, relations with Damascus began to deteriorate after the
coming to power of Hafez Assad’s son, Bashar in 2000. Hariri’s equivocal stance in relation
to Resolution 1559 exposed him to the political abuse of Syria’s allies in Lebanon, who
accused him of ‘engineering’ Resolution 1559 and of ‘conspiring’ against Syria (Saouli
2006).
In this fraught political context, on February 14, 2005, Hariri was assassinated. The
assassination, which occurred within a polity already in the throes of a deep political
crisis, set the course for the normative intervention. Here we observe how domestic
actors with entrenched interests and identities responded in varying ways to the assassi-
nation. The pro-Syrian forces, led by Hizbullah, organized a demonstration on March 8
rejecting Resolution 1559 and the internationalization of the assassination. The anti-
Syrian camp organized a counter demonstration on March 14, calling for Syrian withdra-
wal from Lebanon and for an international investigation. This period 2005–11 would first
trigger a normative intervention and then a normative contestation within Lebanon
between the two camps, March 8 and March 14.
Normative intervention: Forming the STL
We suggest that normative interventions are purposeful acts that seek to transmit norms
and institutions to a domestic setting to realize specific political goals. Lebanon’s divided
society and the Hariri assassination in 2005 enabled such a normative intervention. The
assassination occurred within an international context increasingly suspect of amnesty
laws as well as increasingly supportive of far more interventionist responses at least for
certain large-scale crimes. In the 1990s, the UNSC created the ICTs for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Their contributions to international criminal justice have informed all sub-
sequent tribunals, including the International Criminal Court, hybrid tribunals, as well
as the STL itself (STL 2017, para. 108).
Typically, ICTs are concerned with only the most serious international crimes, which
have tended to occur during civil wars. While Lebanon’s own civil war of 1975–90
could have provided more than enough material to inform atrocity trials, instead, it
was the relatively minor crime of Hariri’s assassination that led to the creation of the
STL, which highlights the political basis of the normative intervention. This required the
framing of the killing as an internationally significant incident deserving of UNSC interven-
tion. The small number of victims in this case was counterbalanced by Hariri’s stature and
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the projected ramifications of his death, which generated a ‘political earthquake’
(Knudsen 2012, 223) domestically, regionally and internationally. Almost immediately,
France and the US called for a decisive international response as permanent members
of the UNSC. A UN Secretary General-mandated fact-finding mission arrived in Beirut
only 11 days after the killing. Alongside this investigation and with Lebanese governmen-
tal approval, UNSC Resolution 1595 (UNSC 2005) established, ‘an international indepen-
dent investigation Commission… [UNIIIC] based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese
authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, including to help ident-
ify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices’ (UNSC 2005a, 2).
While the UNIIIC gathered evidence, aligned domestic and international actors looked
to an even more robust response in the form of an international tribunal through a jointly
signed UN-Lebanon treaty (UNSC 2006a). Such a model would have emulated the stan-
dard hybrid tribunal model, which rests on state consent generating courts that comprise
international and national judges adjudicating on offences under a combination of local
and international norms. But normative interventions of this sort in deeply divided
societies will inevitably trigger resistance. Thus, although the March 14 Prime Minister
Saniora pursued the hybrid model, he faced political and institutional opposition from
the March 8 camp, which resisted internationalization of the crime. First, March 8 ministers
resigned from the government, charactering an international tribunal as ‘unconstitu-
tional’ (Abiad 2005, 52), and then the March 8 House Speaker, Nabih Berri, suspended
the Parliament, thus blocking the ratification of the UNSC agreement. In the face of this
domestic impasse, the March 14 parliamentary alliance submitted a petition to the UN
Secretary-General requesting the establishment of the Tribunal without Lebanon’s
consent, whilst Saniora sought help from the Security Council. President Lahoud objected
to these requests, deeming Saniora’s government as ‘illegitimate’ and, thus, unqualified
to negotiate and sign international treaties (UNSC 2006b, 54; Mugraby 2008, 191).
Failing official Lebanese support, the STL was created by international imposition
through UNSC Chapter VII Resolution 1757 (UNSC 2007). Five out of the 15 voting
members (including Russia and China) abstained, reflecting a lack of international con-
sensus.1 UNSC Chapter VII action requires a case to be made for a, ‘threat to inter-
national peace and security’ as per Article 39 of the UN Charter, and although
challenged – for example in the ICTY’s Tadić case (ICTY 1995) – the jurisdiction of pre-
vious tribunals considering (the international crimes of) genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity were easy to characterize as threats to international peace and secur-
ity. Arguably, the case in relation to Hariri’s killing is far harder to characterize as a threat
to international peace and security, but the Resolution suggested that, ‘this terrorist act
and its implications’ amounted to such a threat. Here, we see the significance of refram-
ing the killing as terrorism with vague reference to its wider effects as an internationa-
lizing move. While the UNSC noted that there was widespread agreement within
Lebanon on the need for ‘justice’, ‘serious obstacles’ entail that this is only possible
through an international tribunal. The underlying norm facilitating the intervention is
that the cure for Lebanese incapacity rests on international intervention as a way to
end to impunity, a norm which Lebanese supporters of the tribunal would advance
to promote their case.
The Statute of the Tribunal is annexed to Resolution 1595 and establishes its normative
and legal basis. Most crucial to our argument here is the nature of the STL’s jurisdiction,
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which has, ‘primacy over the national courts of Lebanon’ (Article 4). The Tribunal was
created without the formal consent of the Lebanese state and impinges on its sover-
eignty, which formed the normative and legal basis for domestic opposition to the tribu-
nal. Furthermore, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction cannot be circumvented through the
granting of amnesty (Article 6) or earlier domestic trials if deemed by the Tribunal to
be partial, improper or acting as a shield from criminal responsibility within the STL’s
remit (Article 5). Article 1 limits the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to the assassination itself and
connected attacks between October 2004 and December 2005. Article 2 sets the appli-
cable law as the Lebanese Criminal Code. This is unique as internationally-created tribu-
nals tend to rest on international offences sometimes as supplemented by domestic
offenses. Lebanon has funded 49 per cent of the Tribunal’s budget, which for the year
of 2018 came to 28.8 million euros. This vast sum amounts to around half of the
county’s justice budget in a context where ‘far more serious crimes remain unaddressed’
(Mugraby 2008, 172).
Political rivalries, normative contestation
Normative interventions, particularly when they are imposed on a divided society like
Lebanon’s, generate normative contestation. In Lebanon, this was marked in the
notable political discourse and debates surrounding the STL in the period 2005–11. Irre-
spective of whether they supported or rejected the international tribunal, Lebanese pol-
itical actors had to stake a normative claim. The main political actors involved in the
normative contestation were ones with political stakes in the system. Our analysis
focuses on twomajor ones, Hizbullah and the Future Movement, which, in Lebanon’s con-
sociational system, represent the two largest sectarian communities: the Sunnis and the
Shi’as. These two actors were also the leaders of the two political coalitions that divided
the country, March 8 (Hizbullah) and March 14 (Future Movement).
What is particularly salient in these contestations is how the political rivals interpreted
the transmitted norms. While both March 8 and March 14 accepted the norms of individ-
ual criminal responsibility under international law and the need for an impartial investi-
gation and trial procedure, normative contestations centred on three themes relating
to how the Tribunal would affirm or weaken Lebanese sovereignty. Here we observe
how normative interventions and contestations both shape and are shaped by a social
order. First, March 14 characterized Lebanon’s judicial institutions as ‘weak’ and thus
prone to political intervention; the establishment of an internationally-recognized tribu-
nal could correct this incapacity and thus strengthen domestic institutions. Second,
March 14 argued and hoped that the STL would act as a ‘deterrent’ for future assassina-
tions and their resulting political instability. Notice here how these arguments dovetail
with international justifications to establish the tribunal. Third, it argued that the STL’s
mandate was ‘legal’ and Lebanon, as a founding member of the UN, should ‘abide’ by
its resolutions and not be ‘isolated’ from the ‘international community’. For March 14
then, the STL as an intervention restores rather than undermines Lebanese sovereignty.
Conversely, March 8 contested these interpretations. First, it argued that the establish-
ment of an international court was an infringement of Lebanon’s sovereignty, protected
by international law. Second, the international drive to establish a tribunal, which has no
precedent, was a ‘political’ act, aiming to isolate and de-legitimize Hizbullah and Syria
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and to create ‘fitna’ [sedition] in Lebanon. Third, the Tribunal was presented as ‘uncon-
stitutional and corrupt’.
Hizbullah’s contestation of the tribunal intensified in 2009 when leaks to the press
hinted at its involvement in the assassination of Hariri (Follath 2009). This galvanized
the Islamic party into becoming the exemplar of domestic resistance against the Tribunal.
Hizbullah has rejected the STL politically in the belief that it is an ‘imperialist’ tool for
emasculating the ‘resistance alliance’ (Iran, Syria, and Hizbullah) in the Middle East.2
This political stance reflects the armed political movement’s realist perception of the
international system. Born in the wake of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Hizbullah
has consistently defended Lebanon from Israeli attacks in the belief that international res-
olutions serve the strong, not the weak (such as Lebanese and Palestinians in its eyes).
‘We live in a world of wolves: There is no international law’, once angrily claimed Nassral-
lah.3 Despite that, Hizbullah could simply have refused to support Lebanon’s delegation
of judicial power to the Tribunal. It has not. Rather, the party’s views of the STL have
fluctuated from cautious resistance, to conditional collaboration and finally to outright
opposition towards the Tribunal. Why is this the case, and why has Hizbullah engaged
in a normative contestation regarding the STL as an instance of normative intervention?
Hizbullah’s attitude towards the STL cannot be divorced from the Party’s socialization
process in Lebanon. Since 1990, this Islamic party has struggled to integrate itself into the
Lebanese socio-political realm with the aim of legitimizing its resistance to Israel. It has
participated in the Lebanese legislature (and since 2005 in the Lebanese government)
and has also forged alliances to bolster its domestic power against Israel. This socialization
process involved an ideological shift: relinquishing the idea of establishing an Islamic
state in Lebanon and accepting Lebanese norms, including the consociational system
and the national state; indeed, Hizbullah presented itself as the custodian of Lebanese
sovereignty against Israeli and American interventions in the country (Saouli 2019).
Thus, this actor’s identity, political interest, and reputation have determined its resistance
to the STL. When Hariri was killed in 2004, Hizbullah faced a predicament: refusing a pur-
portedly fair international investigation (by UNIIIC) would threaten the party’s relations
with Sunnis in Lebanon, and hence endanger Hizbullah’s domestic power, in addition
to isolating Hizbullah as a ‘rogue’ non-state actor. Accepting it, on the other hand,
would expose Lebanon to international forces, which the movement believes have an
interest in defeating Hizbullah. Conversely, Hizbullah’s opponents, in addition to
hoping that international trials would bring justice, regarded the Tribunal as a useful pol-
itical tool to eliminate Syrian influence in Lebanon, and thus extract concessions from
Syria’s ally, Hizbullah.
Rivalries over the STL dominated the discourse of Lebanese political actors in 2005–10.
Our analysis in this section focuses on press conferences held by both actors. Press con-
ferences attract public attention and offer opportunities for actors to advance their pos-
itions in an organized and concentrated manner. The choice of these samples illustrates
important elements of our theoretical framework on normative intervention, namely:
attempts of political actors to accommodate or resist norms, their struggle to shape
and construct the public’s perception in a ‘communicative environment’ (Payne 2001,
39; Sharman 2008), and how norms shape the political discourse and are equally
shaped by it.
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Through long televised conferences, Hassan Nassrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, deployed
normative and legal argumentation to de-legitimize the UNIIIC and the STL by decon-
structing them as political and lacking professionalism, as such questioning the norm
and expectation of international tribunals as impartial. Nassrallah held two conferences
in 2010. He argued that UNIIIC’s investigation, whose findings have formed the basis of
the Tribunal’s evidentiary arsenal, was ‘political’ and did not follow scientific-legal stan-
dards because it had overlooked alternative theories of the Hariri murder. The inter-
national investigators, he contended, had for five years focused on Syria and Hizbullah
as the possible perpetrators without considering the possibility of Israeli involvement.
Here, Nassrallah aimed to challenge the STL’s impartiality. But, beyond mere denuncia-
tion, he then moved on to accuse Israel of the murder and presented what he considered
as ‘indicators’ of evidence. Nassrallah, whom one journalist present described as ‘an
investigator, judge, and TV presenter’, disclosed data intercepted from Israeli reconnais-
sance planes monitoring Hariri’s palace in Beirut and the roads he routinely followed,
especially in the period preceding his murder (Al-Manar 2011b). He then discussed the
testimonies of several Lebanese agents collaborating with Israel, who had been tasked
to gather intelligence on March 14 political leaders. Nassrallah argued that this did not
amount to ‘proof’ of Israeli involvement, but by disclosing the data he aimed to question
the investigators’ focus on Syria and Hizbullah, and hence to delegitimise them as biased:
‘if they were authentic investigators they would use our indicators to interrogate Israel, if
they don’t, then our political accusation of the STL will hold true’. Nassrallah not only
challenged the STL’s prosecutorial focus; he also tried to limit the internationalization
of the investigation to protect what he regarded as Lebanese sovereignty. Instead, he
promised to ‘cooperate’ with an, ‘independent committee appointed by the [Lebanese]
government’ (Al-Manar 2011b). Hizbullah’s aim was to challenge and ultimately under-
mine the ‘legitimacy’ of the international body’s decisions and, hence, reduce the
impact of the Tribunal’s ‘political’ effects in Lebanon.
In reaction, Hizbullah’s opponents suggested that Nassrallah’s material was not legally
compelling; however, they called upon the STL to present its own rebuttal. For example,
Amin Gmeiyal, a March 14 leader, accused Hizbullah of wanting to get rid of the STL and,
instead, asked Nassrallah to cooperate with the Tribunal, which Gmeiyal believed would
help deter future political assassinations in Lebanon.
Unrelenting, Hizbullah resorted to other forms of discursive contestation to advance its
case about the STL’s illegitimacy. On 8 December 2010, Mohammad Raad, a Hizbullah MP,
held a press conference in the Lebanese parliament. This choice of location suggests Hiz-
bullah’s desire to appear as a legitimate representative of the people, engaging in dialo-
gue about the STL. Raad invited a retired judge (Saleem Jreisati) to provide a legal
interpretation. For Raad, the presentation was a ‘scientific and objective’ analysis for
the, ‘public in Lebanon and the Arab and Muslim worlds’. Notwithstanding this aim,
Raad’s introduction was political, highlighting the ‘threat’ of the STL on Lebanon’s sover-
eignty. The STL’s creation, he contended, was imposed on Lebanon by great powers in
the UNSC, ‘bypassing the Lebanese state: it was smuggled in by an illegitimate
[Saniora] government, without the ratification of the Parliament or the signature of the
President’.4 He added that the petition raised by March 14 MPs to the UN had circum-
vented the Lebanese Parliament and was, according to Raad, ‘a form of forgery’
aiming to ‘beg’ the, ‘highest international body [to intervene] for suspect domestic
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and regional political reasons’. For Raad, the investigators’ demand for the telecommuni-
cation data (2003–10), which the Lebanese government was willing to divulge, ‘is very
dangerous and infringes on Lebanese sovereignty whilst endangering national security’.
The STL and UNIIIC, he cautioned, were political and lacked the legal standards that the
international tribunal promises to ingrain in Lebanon.
To illustrate this, the speakers referred to successive leaks to the press as well as the
‘false witnesses’ debacle. Press leaks, which had accused Syria and Hizbullah of the
crime, contended Raad, ‘were intentional, and enabled [our] political rivals to employ
it for political reasons… and aimed to damage the resistance’s [Hizbullah’s armed
wing] reputation’. This was characterized as an infringement of the legal principle of
‘secrecy of the investigation’, which, according to Jreisati, the international investigation
had not respected. For Hizbullah, the leaks exacerbated political divisions in Lebanon,
particularly sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shiites, which it had been struggling
to avoid.
The main goal of advancing these claims was to raise public doubts about the stan-
dards followed by international criminal bodies such as the STL. Raad claimed that,
whilst external powers (especially the US and Israel) had promoted the STL’s establish-
ment, they have since abstained from cooperating with the investigation. Here, he
relies on a particular framing of history to highlight how the US and Israel have rejected
other international tribunals in fear of being held accountable for, ‘crimes in Guantanamo,
Iraq, Afghanistan and others, including Israeli crimes in Lebanon and Palestine…
especially the Sabra and Shatilla massacre’. But ‘why’, asked one journalist, ‘did Hizbullah
initially accept the establishment of the STL, while it now has all these reservations about
it?’ ‘First because [of our concern] for stability’, Raad responded, ‘and, second, in the
hope of reaching a national consensus regarding the STL’ (Al-Manar 2011a).
Hizbullah’s normative arguments raised doubts regarding the STL in the eyes of the
Lebanese public, which in many ways diluted the potential effects of the normative inter-
vention. Were Lebanese institutions weak and best served through international judicial
protection? Would this strengthen Lebanese sovereignty? Such questions required a
response from the STL’s supporters. Two weeks later, March 14 MPs Samir Jisr and Hadi
Houbeish, held another parliamentary conference entitled, ‘The STL as a legal path to
guarantee justice and generate the truth’. Jisr introduced the conference as a ‘legal
response to all the points raised by our colleague MP Raad’. Like Raad, Jisr started with
a political prologue that sets the frame for a justification of the STL. ‘In light of the con-
tinuing fears of political assassinations, which started in the civil war and which were
transferred to Lebanese courts without any results’, Jisr argued that:
It was natural for the opposition forces (March 14) to call upon the international commu-
nity to carry out its responsibilities towards Lebanon and to request the establishment of
an international investigation committee to expose the truth of this crime, after we have
lost all our trust in the abilities of [Lebanese] authorities to deal with these crimes. (Saniora
2010)
Jisr then presented his narrative regarding the inability of Saniora’s government to ratify
the treaty, arguing that Saniora’s government, which March 8 labelled as unconstitu-
tional, was legitimate. Furthermore, Jisr added that the STL’s establishment had not
infringed upon Lebanese sovereignty as it emerged from the UN, an institution created
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by a number of states including Lebanon, a ‘founding member’. The UN intervention
through the STL, he argued, would help protect and buttress Lebanese sovereignty by
deterring future assassinations.5 Jisr’s response highlight’s the urge to legitimise the
international tribunal whilst offering a particular framing of sovereignty, which in this
case cannot be stripped from Lebanon’s own political history.
Regarding the leaks to the press and the ‘false witnesses’, Hobeish noted that he sup-
ported the principle of secrecy of the investigation ‘but the STL cannot be responsible for
press reports, which lack any evidence and which we are unclear about the source behind
the information’. Hobeish relied on legal formalism to argue that the so-called false wit-
nesses had presented their testimonies before an investigative committee not a judicial
authority; hence, until they are examined by the STL, they lack a judicial basis. Jisr con-
cluded by articulating a desire for the STL to prevent future political assassinations.
Since Hariri’s assassination, ‘we have requested the truth for people’s safety; to
prevent fear from dominating people’s minds and volition’ (14 March Organization
2010). This normative stance, which mirrors justifications advanced internationally for
the creation of the STL, highlighted how international criminal justice norms could act
as a deterrent against future assassinations and pave the way towards to real security.
Four years after its inception, the STL finally issued indictments for four Hizbullah
members by sending arrest warrants to the Lebanese government on 30 June 2011.6 Hiz-
bullah refused to hand over the suspects, recognize or collaborate with the STL. Such
staunch opposition was only possible in the face of the STL’s eroded legitimacy in the
eyes of Hizbullah’s supporters, which contestations over the STL had enabled, and in
the context of Lebanon’s divided society which forms the basis on which political mobil-
ization flourishes. If there had been widespread public agreement about the STL’s
mandate and desirability, then it would have been extremely damaging for Hizbullah
to oppose the arrest warrants. Perhaps to solidify further its characterizations of a
harmful international tribunal, Nassrallah gave a televised speech to strengthen claims
about the STL’s purported politicization and to present evidence about its alleged
corrupt members. He accused several investigators and advisors in the STL (by citing
names, and in some cases photos, and job description) to have a priori ‘prejudices’
against resistance movements fighting Israel. Most of these, he claimed, are ‘anti-terror-
ism experts’ and/or ‘intelligence agents for Western governments’.7 ‘Are these people
qualified to interrogate Israel in relation to the murder?’ Nassrallah retorted. One
example cited was Gerhard Lehman, a former vice-president of UNIIIC. Nassrallah
alleged that Lehman received a ‘bribe’ to disclose information about the investigation.
A video of Lehman receiving the bribe was broadcast at the conference.
Conclusion
Shortly after these debates, other regional developments would come to overshadow con-
cerns about the STL. The Syrian civil war has eclipsed all other issues for Hizbullah and has
shaped domestic political debates ever since (Saouli 2019). Meanwhile at The Hague, the
main trial of the four co-accused in absentia preceded with far less engagement and
debate on the part of Lebanese political entrepreneurs. For Hizbullah, the STL ceased to
be an existential threat: the normative contestation it waged on the STL delegitimized
the Tribunal, particularly in the eyes of its growing domestic socio-political base. For
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supporters of the STL, its significance has been hard to sustain in the face of few tangible
outcomes as well as ongoing regional crises. Thus, empirically, this normative intervention
has stalled, but its lasting effects on the political landscape of Lebanon remains, especially
in theway it has instructed political entrepreneurs to speak in increasingly legalized idioms.
The creation of the STL has deepened Lebanon’s political divisions, particularly among its
pro-STL Sunnis and anti-STL Shias. The crisis generated by the STL provided yet another
occasion in which to negotiate the meaning of Lebanese sovereignty.
We have argued that the framework of normative intervention is a useful approach not
only for understanding this episode in Lebanese politics. Our case-study reveals that inter-
national norm diffusion in some cases, such as Lebanon, amounts to a normative interven-
tion, which unlike approaches of norm diffusion, reveals a purposeful attempt by
domestic and international actors to impose norms and institutions on another society
to effect political change. Specifically, we have shown how in Lebanon’s divided
society, which has suffered from a series of political crises, normative intervention is
likely to fail. The normative intervention, we argued, generates normative contestations,
which enable actors to offer varying interpretations of norms that serve their own inter-
ests, identities, and reputations in a given social order. These contestations in the case of
Lebanon have diluted the possible effects of the intervention. In particular, our study
builds on and develops IR scholarship attentive to the importance of domestic culture
and political contestation for (re)shaping international normative interventions.
This case has highlighted how a typically constructivist concern for norms can be
wedded with an appreciation of the coercive dynamics at play when domestic actors
(re)frame norms and institutions arising from UNSC Chapter VII imposition. Constrained
by the vagaries of an international environment that has witnessed the rise of international
criminal justice since the end of the Cold War, Lebanese political actors must now speak in
particular, legalized idioms, all the while staking their claims to represent Lebanese sover-
eignty. Ultimately, both domestic and foreign supporters of the STL had two key objectives:
to alter the domestic and regional balance of power through an assault on Hizbullah and
Syria; and to strengthen domestic legal institutions and capacity through the paradoxical
erosion of Lebanon’s criminal jurisdiction by acculturation into international best practice.
To date, the STL has failed to deliver on either of these counts: Lebanon’s judicial and gov-
ernmental institutions remain racked by division and paralysis and Hizbullah has retained
its prominent political role within an uneasy regional setting of continuing Syrian and
Iranian power. Although the STL was created with the aim of ending impunity in
Lebanon and beyond, the scale of unaddressed atrocity crimes perpetrated next door in
Syria underscores the extremely weak hold of international criminal responsibility norms
for regional political actors. Rather than result in any concerted support for and institutio-
nalization of international criminal justice norms, instead, we have shown how the STL and
the resulting contestation over its creation as normative intervention has produced a soph-
isticated lesson in the arts of legalized debate for Lebanese political actors. In seeking to
champion Lebanese sovereignty as either pro or contra the Tribunal, political entrepre-
neurs became exemplars of norms – as sovereignty either guaranteed or undermined by
the STL. Given Lebanon’s divided social fabric, this article provides a cautionary tale
about the merits of normative intervention whether as an internationalized criminal tribu-
nal in this case, or through other practices, such as constitution writing across postcolonial
societies during and after conflict.
JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING 15
Notes
1. The Resolution had six co-sponsors: Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Slovakia and the United States.
2. For Nassrallah, the STL constitutes external ‘aggression’, aiming to cause ‘sedition in









4. Raad referred to Article 52 in the Lebanese constitution to back up his argument (Jiha 1998).
5. Jisr invokes the preamble of the Lebanese constitution and Chapter Seven of the UN Charter
to advance his claim. He also cites the Tadić Case (ICTY 1995).
6. The original four accused were Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, Assad Hassan
Sabra and Mustafa Amine Badreddine. Hassan Habib Merhi’s case was joined and was filed
by the Prosecution as a consolidated indictment on 7 March 2014. Charges against Bedred-
dine were withdrawn upon reports of his death (12 July 2016). In its recent decision, the Tri-
bunal found only Ayyash guilty of the charges (STL 2020).
7. One of whom is Robert Baer, a former CIA agent who works as an advisor for the STL’s general
prosecutor. Nassrallah presented a letter written by Cassese, the former President of the STL,
advising the Israeli government and claiming that he was a ‘friend of Israel, who considered
resistance movements as terrorists’.
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